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SOVEREIGNTY, ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION, AND THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION©
BY SUSAN HAINSWORTH*
Economic integration is altering the role of the state
and the concept of sovereignty in international law.
Intensifying economic interdependence has rendered
sovereignty almost meaningless for an isolated state.
However, the transfer and pooling of sovereignty in a
jointly designed and mutually acceptable legalistic
international institution allows state interests to be both
respected and represented at the international level.
After addressing the European Union model for
managing advanced economic integration, the paper
examines the extent to which the legal and institutional
attributes of the new World Trade Organization
represents a move towards a more legalistic
international trade order, entailing a transfer of
sovereignty from the state to the international level.
L'int6gration 6conomique vise A modifier le r6le de
l'ttat et la notion de la souverainet6 en droit
international. k cause de l'interd6pendance
6conomique de plus en plus intense, la souverainet6 est
devenue presqu'une notion inutile pour un Etat isol6.
Toutefois, le transfert de la souverainet6 une
institution internationale et 16galiste, cr6e en termes
communs par plusieurs 6tats participants, est une fagon
de respecter et rappresenter les inter~ts des 6tats au
niveau international. D'abord, cet article considbre le
mod~le de l'Union Europ~enne quant a la gestion de
l'intdgration 6conomique plus difficile. Par la suite,
l'article examine les caract~ristiques 16gales et
institutionnelles de la World Trade Organization et
comment elles rappresentant une tendance vers un
ordre commercial plus international et l6galiste, ce qui
constitue le transfert de la souverainet6 du niveau
national au niveau international.
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By bringing into being the World Trade Organization today, we are enshriningthe rule of
law in international economic and trade relations, thus setting universal rules and
disciplines over the temptations of unilateralism and the law of the jungle. ... Regardless
of the size of our economies, from now on we shall all enjoy the same rights and be
subject to the same obligations.
-King Hassan II of Morocco /
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uruguay Round Final Act and the accompanying
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), 2
concluded by 125 countries on 15 April 1994 at Marrakesh, embody the
I Speaking at the closing ceremonies of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations on 15 April 1994, cited in GATr Focus No. 107, May 1994 at 4 [hereinafter Focus 107].
2 he Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (Geneva:
GATT Secretariat, 1994) [hereinafter Results of the Uruguay Round] is over 500 pages in length, and
includes the FinalAct Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round (at 2) [hereinafter FinalAct] and
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (at 6) [hereinafter wro
Agreement]. Annexed as integral parts of the wro Agreement are: the Multilateral Agreements on
Trade in Goods and associated agreements; the General Agreement on Trade in Services; the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes; the Trade Policy Review Mechanism; four
Plurilateral Trade Agreements; twenty-three Ministerial Decisions and Declarations; and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. This is accompanied by approximately
26,000 pages of national tariff and services schedules. It is estimated that the results of the Final
Act, including a 40 per cent global tariff reduction, an extension of trade discipline into new areas,
revamped dispute settlement procedures, and new institutions, will add approximately U.S. $510
billion to annual world income: see GATr Focus No. 112, November 1994.
The World Trade Organization
results of the eight-year Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, representing the most comprehensive international trade
agreement ever. The wro Agreement and its annexes strengthen
existing international trade discipline, and extend international trade law
rules into new economic sectors. Perhaps most importantly, the
Agreement created the WTO, which came into existence on 1 January
1995, to provide a unified common institutional framework for the
conduct of trade relations among its members. Established with a view
to developing "an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral
trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade [GATT], the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of
the results of the Uruguay Round, ' 3 the WTO "will be the legal and
institutional pillar of international trade in the twenty-first century."4
This paper endeavours only to provide the foundations for a
much broader analysis of the post-World War II legal-institutional
evolution of the international trade system, and of the role of the wVo in
fostering the rule of law in international trade, seen in the context of the
changing relationship between sovereignty and economic integration.
Premised on the belief that the WTO'S legal and institutional attributes
will affect most profoundly the effectiveness of substantive rules
governing the new international trade order, this paper will concentrate
on the major legal-institutional or constitutional developments rather
than on substantive trade policy reforms and rules.
I begin with a brief exploration of the correlation between
sovereignty and international economic integration, and of the
intersection of this relationship with rule-oriented and power-oriented
models of international organization. I will then address the European
Union (Eu) model for managing advanced economic integration. After
a short historical overview of the legal-institutional evolution of the
global trade system, I will examine the extent to which certain legal and
institutional arrangements enshrined in the new WTO Agreement
represent a move towards a more legalistic international trade order,
entailing a transferral of sovereign authority in the trade sphere from the
state to the international level. The three WTO legal-institutional
developments which this paper will focus upon are: (i) the WTO; (ii) the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism; and (iii) the Dispute Settlement
Mechanism.
3 Preamble to the wro Agreement, ibiL at 6. See Part V, below, for a discussion of the GATr.
4 Moroccan Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed in a speech at the opening of the Marrakesh
Ministerial meeting on 12 April 1994, cited in Focus 107, supra note 1 at 2.
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I. SOVEREIGNTY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Economic integration, and the consequent deepening of
multilevel international economic interdependence, is the most powerful
force propelling the transformation of the contemporary international
system. Economic integration is altering the way we view the role of the
state and the way we conceptualize sovereignty in international law.
Because of traditional views of sovereignty, international law
rules have been seen as different from, and most definitely as weaker
than, domestic law rules. Viewing the state as the only sovereign entity
in the international order, J. Austin refuted the basic principle that
international law could properly even be called "law."5 For Austin, the
ultimate and exclusive sovereignty of the state logically negated the
existence of international law.
The classical view of international law, founded on the principle
of the sovereign equality of selfish and self-contained states with each
asserting exclusive jurisdiction over activities within its territory,6
endeavours to establish a framework for peaceful cooperation among
states. However, this view no longer accurately reflects reality. Its rigid
conception of inviolable state territorial sovereignty fails to acknowledge
the toll that economic integration has taken upon the state's ability to
control activities within its territory. This view of international law does
not accommodate the evolving meaning of sovereignty, nor does it
5 Austin defined laws "properly so-called" as commands, and "positive law," the appropriate
matter for jurisprudence as the commands of the sovereign. For Austin, the law among nations was
more accurately called "positive morality": see D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International
Law, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) at 6. For Austin's theories on state sovereignty and
international law, see also J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, vol. 1, 5th ed. (London: John
Murray, 1885), especially at 225-26; RA. Eastwood & G.W. Keeton, The Austinian Theories of Law
and Sovereignty (London: Methuen, 1929); and W.J. Brown, The Austinian Theory of Law (London:
John Murray, 1926).
6 This view finds its expression in many post-war international legal instruments. See, for
example, Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, 59 Stat. 1031, 145
U.K.F.S. 805, arts. 2 and 78; Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
UNGA Res. 2625 (1970) 9 I.L.M. 1292; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNGA
Res. 3281 (1975) 14 I.LM. 251. For an analysis of sovereignty as it relates to the United Nations
system, see D. Nincic, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the United
Nations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).
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readily favour the development of an integrated and rule-oriented
international legal order.7
The international system can no longer be seen in classical realist
terms as a community of hard-shelled and self-sufficient sovereign states
selfishly pursuing their own interests without regard to the actions and
policies of others. Rather, the inexorable progress of economic
integration has penetrated state borders, making the state a porous and
vulnerable entity transcended by transnational activities and forces.
Burgeoning transnational economic relations and activities have
strained the regulatory and normative capacity of national and
international institutions. Indeed, national and international authorities
often appear to be at the mercy of international currency and bond
traders, as the information age has brought with it the ability to transfer
massive amounts of money anywhere in the world virtually
instantaneously. Private citizens within states are becoming more
directly affected by economic forces beyond their countries' boundaries.8
In these circumstances, sovereignty has become almost meaningless or
irrelevant for an isolated state. These factors have heightened the need
for a more robust international framework of rules in order to enhance
the management of systemic economic interdependence. The
development of international law rules in this direction will provide a
degree of order and certainty. It will also reduce frictions caused by
problematic unregulated policy differences among states.9
Increased international economic interaction has placed many
areas that were formerly regulated at the state level squarely onto the
international agenda.10 This overlapping of the domestic and the
international both permits and demands the creation of more effective
7 See J.P. Trachtman, "L'tat, C'est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration and
Subsidiarity" (1992) 33 Harv. Int'l LU. 459 at 461. See also L. Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia,
1648-1948" (1948) 42 AJIL 20 at 40, where Gross states that the Westphalian system of
international law, characterized by "rugged individualism of territorial and heterogeneous states,
balance of power, equality of states and toleration ... ill accommodates itself to the international
rule of law reenforced by necessary institutions."
8 j. Jackson, Restructuring the GA7T System (New York: Council on Foreign Relations for the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990) at 53-54 [hereinafter Restructuring GArr].
9 See, for example, R.E. Hudec, "Public International Economic Law: The Academy Must
Invest" (1992) 1 Minn. J. Global Trade 5 at 6-7.
10 See, for example, D.P. Steger, "The Impact of GATr/MTO Rule-making and Rule-
Interpretation on the Sovereignty of States" in State Sovereignty: The Challenge of a Changing World
(Ottawa: Canadian Council on International Law, 1992) 138 at 140-41. Examples are trade in
services, trade-related investment measures, trade-related aspects of intellectual property, and
product standardization.
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international law rules and the fostering of common approaches in these
areas. As Brierly noted in relation to the past relative weakness of
international law:
[t]he restricted range of international law is merely the counterpart of the wide freedom
of independent action which states claim in virtue of their sovereignty.... Law will never
play a really effective part in international relations until it can annex to its own sphere
some of the matters which at present lie within the "domestic jurisdiction" of the several
states.11
Economic integration is thus forcing international relations to
"annex to its own sphere" ever more trade-related sectors. The
development of the rule of law in international trade thus constitutes not
merely an aspiration, but a necessity. By developing accepted, agreed-
upon, and consistent normative guidelines as parameters ("outer limits")
for national policy-making in trade-related areas, international law rules
will promote necessary convergence of domestic policies. 12
State sovereignty and the effective or binding nature of
international law rules have typically been thought of as inversely
proportional. This tension between state sovereignty and international
legal authority is the defining dynamic of the contemporary global
economy.13 In the regulation of international trade it is helpful to think
that, to the extent that sovereign authority is taken from the state, it can
be transferred to-and pooled at-the international level. Thus
sovereignty should not be considered a finite concept reserved
exclusively to the state, but must rather be seen as flexible and fluid:
"[s]overeignty, viewed as an allocation of power and responsibility, is
never lost, but only reallocated. ... When a state's sovereignty is reduced,
the important question raised is where the sovereignty goes."'14
This idea of sovereignty as a quality that can be distributed and
reallocated within the international system cuts across the traditional
analysis of international law in terms of the monist and dualist
paradigms. It seems to call for a role for the state that falls between
these two models.
11 J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1963), cited in Harris,
supra note 5 at 4.
12 Steger, supra note 10 at 141. Steger does not see this as a diminution of sovereignty of
states in the regulation of domestic policy areas, but as the development of more consistent and
harmonious international rules in an increasingly interdependent world.
13 G.R. Winham, The Evolution of International Trade Agreements (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1992) at 130, describes this tension as one between nationalism and internationalism.
14 J.P. Trachtman, "Reflections on the Nature of the State: Sovereignty, Power and
Responsibility" (1994) 20 Can.-U.S. LJ. 399 at 400 [hereinafter "Reflections"].
[VOL. 33 No. 3
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The dualist theory, premised upon the existence and durability of
state sovereignty, holds that national law and international law co-exist
as two separate and distinct entities in a definite hierarchy. Valid and
binding international law norms, while universal, are at the same time
barred from transgressing the rigid border of a sovereign state and
affecting individuals within that state, unless transformed into the
domestic legal system through the legislative instrumentality of the
state.15
Monism, on the other hand, presupposes the existence of a single
system of international legal norms binding upon states and individuals
within those states. In the monist view, states are legal fictions and the
individual is the ultimate subject of international law. Because monism
brings the individual into direct contact with international law, the state
does not act as an intermediary transforming international law rules into
the state legal order. Rather, international law will be automatically
incorporated and available as a domestic law instrument before domestic
courts.
Neither of these models, however, adequately provides for the
possibility that the state is neither wholly subordinate nor wholly
supreme to a distinct and co-existing international legal order, but rather
is a full-fledged participant in an integrated international community,
"both forming and complying with law.' '16 The state as a porous but
resilient entity has a contingent stake in designing an international
system, which both respects and represents its interests in the
international arena.
III. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE "RULE-ORIENTED" VS.
"POWER-ORIENTED" DEBATE
The relationship between sovereignty and economic integration
intersects with the debate over rule-oriented and power-oriented views
of international organizations or rule systems.
The power-oriented or pragmatic approach focuses on
international institutions as fora for state interaction characterized by
negotiation, conciliation, and compromise. A general framework of
basic rules allowing for flexibility and lacking an effective enforcement
mechanism embodies the pragmatic aspiration. It has traditionally been
15 See Restructuring GATT, supra note 8 at 30-31; and D. Lasok & K.P.E. Bridge, Law and
Institutions of the European Union, 6th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1994) at 283.
16 See "Reflections," supra note 14 at 403.
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founded upon the entrenched systemic resistance to the erosion of
national sovereignty.
On the other hand, a rule-oriented international institution is
based upon a legally binding constitution setting out clear and precise
rules and obligations, enforced by an effective and impartial adjudication
mechanism that fosters and enforces a stable and consistent
international legal order. Its primary objective is the maximization of
stability and predictability.
Legalism has typically been denounced by states jealous of their
sovereignty. It is interesting to note, however, that progressive
international economic integration is transforming the meaning of
sovereignty in the context of the "rule-oriented" versus "power-
oriented."
The traditional power-oriented approach to international order
downplays the significance and authority of international law rules. This
view has traditionally been interpreted as allowing members of the
international community to maintain their legal sovereignty and policy-
making competence intact despite their international obligations. While
the power-oriented model offers the illusion of retaining state
sovereignty without international impingement, this illusion is untenable
given the present actual extent of transnational economic interaction.
In an era of intensifying economic integration spilling over into
ever more sectors of economic activity, states increasingly find
parameters for their actions dictated to them by the domestic and
extraterritorial economic policies and activities of other states and non-
state actors. Money and investment flow freely across borders. Citizens
within states are increasingly affected by economic forces-and pursue
economic activities-outside or across state borders. Because of its
mistaken premise that the state still enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over
economic activities taking place within its territory, the power-oriented
international rule system neither accommodates nor takes account of the
forces of functionally driven international economic integration.
In such an economically interdependent world, a rule-oriented
international institution, involving a set of effective, previously agreed-
upon, precise, and enforceable norms acceptable to all the participants,
can be seen as a way to ensure that individual states have at least
conceptual and legal input into the architecture of the international
system by which they will be governed. The transfer of sovereign
authority in certain areas as necessary, and its pooling at the
international level, allows the state far more authority and opportunity
to exercise control over the actions of other states in the system and over
the legal environment in which it and its citizens operate. The
[VOL 33 No. 3
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international rule system or institution does not supplant but, rather,
supplements the state and represents the interests of the state
participants on the international plane.
This process can be viewed as a cost-benefit analysis between the
degree of local autonomy foregone and the prosperity and measure of
influence over other states' actions obtained.1 7 By pooling their
sovereignty at the international level, states gain influence and authority
within the system, leaving little room for the political whims and
uncertainties inherent in an anarchic power-oriented system. States are
not at the mercy of the unmitigated political discretion of other states
within the system, but rather may operate on the assumption that all
other states will adhere to the legally valid, binding, and consistent
international norms which they have all have jointly designed to serve
their interests.
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A LEGAL-INSTITUTIONAL
MODEL FOR MANAGING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Advocates of a rule-based international trade system point to the
Eu's evolution, from a post-war customs union towards an intricate rule-
oriented structure, as a potential model for the development of the
GATr/WTO system.18 There are issues on the Bu's agenda that the WTO
will inevitably have to address as global economic integration
progresses.19
The Eu2 0 has developed into the most integrated multinational
economic system in the contemporary international order. The creation
1 7 See Trachtman, supra note 7 at 465 and 467.
18 See, for example, J. Jackson, "Commentary," in A.V. Deardorff & R.M. Stern, eds.,
Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1994) 599 at 604; and Trachtman, supra note 7 at 463-67.
1 9 The Preparatory Committee for the wro, along with being charged with ensuring a smooth
transition from the GATr to the WTO, was also given the responsibility of examining these further
subjects with a view to including on the wro agenda: the relationship between immigration policies
and international trade; trade and competition policy, including rules on export financing and
restrictive business practices; trade and investment; regionalism; the interaction between trade
policies and policies relating to financial and monetary matters, including debt and commodity
markets; international trade and company law; the establishment of a compensation mechanism for
the erosion of preferences; the link between trade, development, political stability, and the
alleviation of poverty; and unilateral or extraterritorial trade measures. See Focus 107, supra note
1. All of these items have been on the Eu agenda.
20 For a detailed account of the Eu constitutional brder and institutions, see Lasok & Bridge,
supra note 15.
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of an internal market characterized by the complete freedom of
movement of goods, services, persons, and capital is built on the legal
foundation provided by the agreed-upon substantive and procedural
rules entrenched in the Rome Treaty21 and its subsequent revisions. The
European Court of Justice (EcJ), whose decisions are binding upon
member states and upon natural and legal persons within those states,
has constitutionalized the Eu's legal order and built an authoritative
body of jurisprudence concerning economic integration. The
Commission, with its mandate to act as a guardian of the Treaty and to
pursue further integration, has-particularly in the aftermath of the
1992 Maastricht Treaty22-gained competence in an ever-growing
number and range of issue-areas. Decision making in the Council of
Ministers takes place by qualified majority in many domains.
The Eu's supranational legal order is characterized by the fact
that the member states are not entirely sovereign, as they have delegated
a portion of their law-making authority in certain fields to the EU. Some
of the rules contained in the Rome Treaty (and its revisions) are directly
applicable within the legal orders of the member states and directly
enforceable by individuals. Community law has primacy over national
law. Directly applicable provisions of Community law are given effect
immediately over inconsistent national legislation. It is not necessary for
a member state court to request or await the formal setting aside of the
national provision by legislative, judicial, or other constitutional means.
In addition, the enactment of new national provisions is prohibited to
the extent that they are incompatible with Community law.23 In a given
sphere of activity, either the member state or the Eu has sovereign
authority, although there are certain spheres of mixed competence
where they share authority.
Thus, Eu member states have agreed to respect the authority of
the ECJ over matters and persons within their territory falling within the
jurisdiction of the ECJ, and have also consented to the recognition of EU
law by their municipal courts.2 4 In Van Gend en Loos, the EcJ stated that
the European Community's legal system "constitutes a new legal order
in international law for whose benefit the states have limited their
21 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (25 March 1957) 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter Rome Treaty].
2 2 Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992,31 I.L.M. 247.
23 See Ammistrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A. (No. 2) (Case 106/77),
[1978] 3 C.M.L.R 263.
24 Lasok & Bridge, supra note 15 at 283.
[VOL. 33 No. 3
The World Trade Organization
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which
comprise not only the Member States but also their nationals."25
The limitation of the jurisdiction and sovereign rights of the
member states favours a transfer of sovereign authority to the
Community level. Through this reallocation of sovereignty, member
states curtail their autonomy but increase their influence by directly
participating in the design of the international rules which govern them.
They then agree to abide by the management and enforcement of the
rules.
Of course, the Eu's supranational model, based on the
permanence, authority, and direct applicability of rules enforced by the
permanent Ecd, does not represent the only existing model for the
management of contemporary international economic interdependence.
Jonathan Fried, for example, argues that the North American Free Trade
Agreement26 -with a more decentralized institutional framework for
fostering adherence to, implementation, and enforcement of trade
rules-also creates a free trade system that "works." 2 7 This paper
concentrates on the EU model because of the far more advanced,
ambitious, and legally effective system for the management of economic
interdependence which it supplies.
V. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE SYSTEM
While the international community acknowledged the wisdom of
designing, and adhering to, an international code of commercial conduct
with the emergence of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade28 in
1947, there was reluctance to accept an international organization to
administer, monitor, legislate, and adjudicate on the basis of this code of
conduct. The 1994 Results of the Uruguay Round, establishing the wro,
represents the third endeavour over the last fifty years to introduce an
25 (Case 26/62) Van Gend en Loos v. NederlandsAdministratie der Belastingen, [1963] E.C.R. 1
at 29; see also Lasok & Bridge, supra note 15 at 81. Another seminal case similarly dealing with the
nature of the EC legal order is (Case 6/64) Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per l'Energia Ellettrica ENEL,
[1964] C.M.LR. 425 (E.CJ.).
26 17 December 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 605
[hereinafter NAFrA].
27 See J.T. Fried, "Two Paradigms for the Rule of International Trade Law" (1994) 20 Can.-
U.S. LU. 39.
28 30 October 1947, Can. T.S. 1947 No. 27,55 U.N.T.S. 187, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, cited to Results
of the Uruguay Round, supra note 2 at 486 [hereinafter GATr 1947].
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institutional and organizational framework to supervise the international
trading system and administer the GATr. The previous two attempts, in
1948 and in 1955, were defeated in the United States Congress. The
1948 Havana Charter29 for an International Trade Organization (TO)
failed because, although it would have promoted stability by fostering
the rule of law in international trade (by providing fairly precise
international norms and a strong dispute settlement procedure),.its
victorious opponents argued that it would unacceptably usurp national
sovereignty and autonomy in the commercial policy domain. 0 Attempts
to impose a strong supranational legal framework for international trade
may also have been unrealistic during this period of relatively low
economic integration.
Drafted merely as an interim agreement pending the coming into
force of the rro Charter, the GATT then emerged, by default, as the
primary instrument for international commercial policy regulation. This
happened despite the fact that the GATT was only applied provisionally
and lacked the constitutional, structural, and organizational features to
perform the role thrust upon it after the ITO'S demise. Originally a basic
set of rules and tariff concessions, it became a hybrid institution, serving
both as an international trade agreement and an institutional
manifestation of the trade agreements process.31 Through successive
rounds of multilateral trade negotiations and the development of
procedures to carry on work between sessions of the contracting parties,
the GATT subsequently evolved into a de facto international
organization.3 2 Its informal institutional growth has been cited as an
29 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment held at Havana, Cuba, from 21
November 1947to 24March 1948: FinalAct and Related Documents, UN Doc. E/Conf.2/78 (1948).
3 0 For a comprehensive account of the demise of the Havana Charter and the origins of the
GrATr, see: W.A. Brown, The United States and the Restoration of World Trade (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1950); R.N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1956); C. Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (New York: Macmillan, 1949); G. Bronz, "The
International Trade Organization Charter" (1949) 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1089; J. Jackson, World Trade
and the Law of GATr (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Book Company, 1969) [hereinafter World Trade];
and R. Hudec, The GA7T Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (Salem: Butterworths, 1990).
The 1955 attempt to form the Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC) is dealt with in World
Trade, ibid. at 50-52; Hudec, ibid. at 72-73; and G. Bronz, "An International Trade Organization:
The Second Attempt" (1956) 69 Harv. L. Rev. 440.
31 Winham, supra note 13 at 43.
32 See, for example, K. Dam, "The GATr as an International Organization" (1969) 3 J. World
Trade 374.
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important precedent in international law for the formation of necessary
institutional attributes without legal foundation 33
Increased economic integration in the 1970s made it necessary
(and more feasible) to tackle the growing problem of non-tariff trade
barriers (NTB), which had taken the place of tariffs as the most prevalent
obstacles to international trade liberalization efforts. However, because
of the procedural and substantive difficulties in amending the GATr, and
in the absence of a consensus among all of the contracting parties, the
results of the Tokyo Round (1973-79) were limited to a series of side
agreements and understandings concerning NIBS.s4 As they were signed
only by some, not all, GATT contracting parties, these side agreements
had the problematic result of violating the GATT most-favoured-nation
(MFN) principle and splintering the GATT system into varying levels of
legal obligations. In addition, each of the NTB codes contained its own
dispute settlement procedures. The growing complexity of the GATT
system appeared unmanageable and unable to provide a viable rule
structure for managing international trade relations.35
The GATT's evolution steered a course between strict rule-
orientation and a purely pragmatic accommodation of political
realities.36 As a set of international legal rules, the GATT's effectiveness
was limited by an inadequate institutional setting, the prevalence of
negotiated dispute settlement, and the lack of mechanisms for rule
creation and monitoring of rule adherence. This was coupled with weak
application and enforcement of rules in the form of a relatively feeble
dispute settlement system, which allowed a losing party to block an
33 World Trade, supra note 30 at 153.
34 See The Texts of the Tokyo RoundAgreements (Geneva: GATr, 1986).
35 See, for example, A.F. Lowenfeld, "Remedies along with Rights: Institutional Reform in
the New GATr" (1994) 88 AJIL 477; and V. Curzon Price, "New Institutional Developments in
GAae' (1992) 1 Minn. J. Global Trade 87 at 105.
36 See, for example, 0. Long, Law and its Limitations in the International Trade System
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) at 8. Pragmatists saw flexibility, adaptability, and diplomatic
compromise as GATr's most important characteristics. Dam, for example, praised consultative and
conciliatory procedures as they avoid "poisoning the diplomatic atmosphere with charges of
illegality": see K. Dam, The GAT7. Law and International Economic Organization (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970) at 354; and R. HudeC, "GATE or GABB: The Future Design of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" (1971) 80 Yale L.J. 1299 at 1305 [hereinafter "GATr or
GABB"]. Legalists argued GATr should be seen more as a kind of "constitution," a legally binding
international instrument setting out concrete and precise rules, and enforced by an effective and
impartial adjudication mechanism: see "GATr or GABB," ibid. at 1307; World Trade, supra note 30 at
767; J. Jackson & W. Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, 2d ed. (St. Paul:
West, 1986); and Restructuring GAT, supra note 8.
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unfavourable panel report with relative ease, and did not ensure
implementation of panel recommendations.
The GATT'S gradual and organic legal and institutional
development has been considered to be its basic strength, since its
growth was in line with what sovereign states were willing to tolerate at
the time, and thus more likely to respect.3 7 The loosely rule-oriented
pre-Uruguay Round GATT framework left state autonomy and
sovereignty in the trade sphere essentially untouched. This was perhaps
understandable in view of the relatively low level of international
economic integration during the GATT's first thirty years of existence.
Along with increased economic interdependence and a growing
body of unregulated transnational activity in the 1980s, however,
emerged recognition of the need to revitalize the GATT system by
strengthening existing disciplines and extending norms into new areas.
An increase in number and diversity of GATT membership, and the
mushrooming legal complexity caused by the multiplicity of agreements
and side agreements in the fragmented GATT regime, militated in favour
of a revised, more integrated, and stronger legal framework. In
recognition of these factors, the Uruguay Round was launched at the
Punta del Este GATT ministerial meeting in September 1986.38 The
Ministerial Declaration stressed the necessity of reintroducing legal
uniformity into international trade obligations by specifically stipulating
that the results of the Uruguay Round "shall be treated as parts of a
single undertaking."3 9
While no specific mention was made of the formation of any type
of overarching international trade organization, institutional and
constitutional reforms still figured largely on the Uruguay Round
agenda. A stated objective of the negotiation was to "strengthen the
role of GATT, improve the multilateral trading system based on the
principles and rules of GATT and bring about a wider coverage of world
trade under agreed, effective and enforceable multilateral disciplines." 40
Under the rubric of "Functioning of the GATT System" (FoGs), the Punta
del Este Declaration stated:
3 7 Curzon Price, supra note 35 at 88-89; and Long, ibid. at 61-64.
38 Originally scheduled to conclude in Brussels in 1990, the Round finally ended in December
1993 and the FinalAct, supra note 2, was signed on 15 April 1994.
39 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, 20 September 1986, 33rd Supp. B.I.S.D.
(1987) 19 at 20.
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Negotiations shall aim to develop understandings and arrangements:
(i) to enhance the surveillance in the GATr to enable regular monitoring of trade policies
and practices of contracting parties and their impact on the functioning of the
multilateral trading system;
(ii) to improve the overall effectiveness and decision-making of the GATr as an institution,
including, inter alia, through involvement of Ministers;
(iii) to increase the contribution of the GATr to achieving greater coherence in global
economic policy-making through strengthening its relationship with other international
organizations responsible for monetary and financial matters.
4p
The focus of strengthening the rule-oriented nature of the
international trade system in the FOGS was on trade policy surveillance,
enhanced ministerial involvement, and a strengthened dispute
settlement mechanism. Formal proposals for a multilateral trade
organization emerged in 1990-91,42 and were first formally iterated in
the 1991 "Dunkel Draft" Agreement.43
VI. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT:
TOWARDS MANAGEMENT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION
At the time of the signing of the wro Agreement in Marrakesh
on 15 April 1994, the participating trade ministers affirmed that "the
establishment of the WTO ushers in a new era of global economic
cooperation, reflecting the widespread desire to operate in a fairer and
more open multilateral trading system for the benefit and welfare of
their peoples."44
The Preamble to the wTo Agreement restates the GAT"
objectives of "raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a
large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand,
and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while
allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources."45 The Preamble
adds the concept of sustainable development and, in particular,
41 ibid. at 26.
42 See G. Patterson & E. Patterson, "The Road from GATr to MTO" (1994) 3 Minn. J. Global
Trade 35 at 42-43. The design for the wro can largely be traced back to Restructuing GAiT, supra
note 8: Jackson's ideas on a new treaty instrument containing the organizational constitution for a
multilateral trade organization with provision for an integrated dispute settlement mechanism were
taken up in proposals by the European Community and Canada in 1990-91.
43 Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, oATr Doc. MTN.TNCV/FA (20 December 1991).
44 Focus 107, supra note 1 at 7.
45 Supra note 2 at 6.
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recognizes the necessity of positive efforts to promote the interests of
developing countries in the multilateral trading system. With a view to
achieving greater coherence in global economic policymaking, the wrro is
to cooperate with the International Monetary Fund and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. A half-
century after it was originally envisaged, the third pillar of the Bretton
Woods triumvirate is finally in place (although the WTO, unlike the 1948
fro, is not formally a part of the United Nations system).
The w-ro Agreement and its related agreements will supersede
prior GATT arrangements, and GATT 199446 is legally distinct from GATT
1947.47 The wTo will not "succeed" the GATT 1947 within the meaning of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.48 To the extent that
national governments implement the Uruguay Round agreements and
do not simultaneously withdraw from GATT's Protocol of Provisional
Application, they are simultaneously bound by two different sets of
obligations to two different sets of countries for a transitional period of
one year.49 This transitional period of co-existence is intended to further
the stability of the multilateral trading system. 50
A. The World Trade Organization
1. Functions and scope
The functions of the wTo are to facilitate the implementation,
administration, and operation, and to further the objectives of the wTo
Agreement and other legal instruments and agreements resulting from
46 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, being annex 1A to the WTo Agreement, in
Results of the Uruguay Round, supra note 2 at 21 [hereinafter GATr 1994].
4 7 Supra note 28.
48 VKenna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
between International Organizations, 20 March 1986, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.129/15 (1986), 25 I.L.M.
543, arts. 30 and 59.
49 Note that under the GATr 1994, supra note 45, art. 1(a), the provisions of GATT 1947 "as
rectified, amended or modified by the terms of legal instruments which have entered into force
before the date of entry into force of the wio Agreement" form part of GATr 1994 (excluding the
Protocol of Provisional Application).
50 The transitional period may be extended for no more than one additional year. At the end
of the period, "the legal instruments through which the contracting parties apply the GATr 1947" are
to be terminated. See "Transitional Co-existence of the GATr 1947 and the wro Agreement," cited
in GAir Focus No. 113, December 1994 at 4-5 (decision taken by 8 December 1994 Implementation
Conference).
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the Uruguay Round.5 1 The WTO will provide a forum for negotiations
and for constant ministerial involvement to advance the effectiveness of
the rule-oriented institutional framework. It will administer the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, applicable to disputes arising under all the Multilateral
Agreements, to bring uniformity and consistency to the clarification and
enforcement of members' legal obligations. It will also administer the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism to provide transparency for domestic
policies and encourage compliance with wTo norms.
The WTo is the first permanent international trade organization
in history, with its own Secretariat and administrative infrastructure.
This contrasts markedly with the GATT's nature as a provisional treaty,
surrounded by a network of side agreements, and supported by a series
of ad hoc arrangements and a Secretariat borrowed from the Interim
Committee for the International Trade Organization (icrro). The WTO
provides a much stronger institutional framework for the development,
application, and enforcement of international legal norms in the trade
sphere.
The scope of the wTo is far broader than that of the GATT 1947,
and it is involved in many areas which formerly were seen as the
exclusive reserve of states. Under its aegis now are arrangements for
almost every sector of trade-related interaction, including multilateral
frameworks for trade in agriculture, textile, clothing, services, as well as
trade-related aspects of intellectual property, investment measures, and
the environment. Strengthened GATT disciplines have been uniformly
extended into these new areas. The WTo administers a unified and
integrated set of agreements which apply equally to all members.5 2
Thus, the laws, policies, and administrative practices of each member
must conform with its obligations in the Multilateral Trade Agreements
and the Plurilateral Trade Agreements. This contrasts with the untidy
and extensive network of agreements and side agreements which had
resulted in different layers of legal obligations under the GAT 1947. A
major achievement of the WTO, therefore, is that it brings uniformity
back to the law of international trade 53
51 wro Agreement, supra note 2, art. III.
52 Ibid., annexes 1, 2, and 3; the Plurilateral Agreements, being annex 4 to the wTo
Agreement, ibidL at 438, only apply to signatories. However, art. XIII of the WTo Agreement
provides, in exceptional cases, for the non-application of Multilateral Trade Agreements between
Particular Members; art. XI provides for certain exceptions for less developed countries.
53 Lowenfeld, supra note 35 at 479.
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The w-ro will be closer to a truly global organization than the
GATT 1947 ever was. One hundred and twenty-five countries signed the
Marrakesh Final Act. On 1 January 1995, there were eighty-five WTO
original founding members, and ratification procedures in other
signatories are still under way. It is anticipated that China and Russia
will eventuallyjoin. The original members of the wrro are the GATT 1947
contracting parties who have agreed to all of the Multilateral Trade
Agreements and have presented schedules of market access
commitments for industrial goods, agricultural goods, and services.5 4
Less developed countries only have to "undertake commitments and
concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development,
financial and trade needs or their administrative and institutional
capabilities."55 Accession of other states to the Multilateral Trade
Agreements requires a two-thirds majority vote in the Ministerial
Conference. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements provide for their own
accession requirements.5 6
Like the United Nations family of organizations and other
international organizations, the wTo will have legal personality and each
of the members must accord it the legal capacity and the privileges and
immunities necessary for the exercise of its functions5 7
2. Structure
As Figure 1 below indicates, the WTO is to be composed of a
Ministerial Conference, a General Council (which will also convene, as
appropriate, as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the Trade Policy
Review Body (T'RB)); a Council for Trade in Goods; a Council for Trade
in Services; and a Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights. The latter three Councils have the authority to
establish subsidiary bodies as required. The Ministerial Conference also
has the authority to establish a Committee on Trade and Development;
a Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions; a Committee on
Budget, Finance and Administration; and "such additional Committees
54 wro Agreement, supra note 2, art. XI.
5 5 1bid.; and Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries, in Results of the
Uruguay Round, supra note 2 at 440.
56 wro Agreement, supra note 2, art. XII.
571bi&, art. VIII.
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with such functions as it may deem appropriate." 5 8  The bodies
established in the Plurilateral Trade Agreements are to carry out the
functions assigned to them and to "operate within the institutional
framework of the wTo."5 9 They are to report regularly to the WTO
General Council.
Figure 1: Structure of the wro
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
(every two years)
Settlement of disputes GENERAL COUNCIL Trade Policy Review
Committee on Trade s
and Development
Committee on Bane IoLcm CUNI TRIPS
FOR FOP COUNCIL
of'Payments SEVCS OD intell. prop.)
[Committee on Budget 01: El 000 [] [] El[  ]
F1 Committees set up to administer the various arrangements.
Source: GATr Focus No. 107, May 1994.
The Ministerial Conference, composed of representatives of all
members, meets at least once every two years. The Ministerial Council
is responsible for executing the functions of the wTo and has the
authority "to take decisions on all matters under any of the Multilateral
Trade Agreements." 60 It can delegate authority to the General Council.
The General Council essentially replaces the former GATr
Council. It is composed of representatives of all the members. It will
carry on the functions of the Ministerial Conference and meet "as
appropriate" in the intervals between its meetings.61 It runs the day-to-
day operations of the WTO. The General Council will convene as
5 8 Ibid, art. IV(7).
59 ]bidL, art. IV(8).
60 Ibid, art. IV(1).
6 Ibid, art. IV(2).
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appropriate to discharge its duties as the DSB and the T'n3. The General
Council also bears the responsibility for making appropriate
arrangements with non-governmental and other intergovernmental
organizations whose mandates overlap with that of the wTo.
The wro Agreement provides for the Secretariat of the WTO,
headed by a Director-General. This ends the anomalous arrangement
that had persisted since 1947 of the GATr "borrowing" the services of the
icrro Secretariat. The Ministerial Conference is charged with the duty
of appointing the Director-General and adopting regulations setting out
the powers, duties, conditions, and terms of office. The Director-
General appoints the staff and sets the duties and conditions of service
in accordance with Ministerial Conference regulations. The Agreement
expressly stipulates that the responsibilities of the Director-General and
Secretariat "shall be exclusively international in character" and that
neither the Director-General nor the Secretariat are to "seek or accept
instructions from any government" or any other external duthority.62
3. Decision making and rule creation: interpretations, waivers, and
amendments
The practice of decision making by consensus, as in the GATr
1947, will persist in the wro. Consensus is deemed to exist where no
member formally voices an objection. Where consensus is found not to
be possible, issues will be decided by a majority of votes cast (on a one-
vote-per-country basis), except as otherwise provided (for example, the
Understanding on Dispute Settlement provides for special decision-
making rules in that area). The Agreement contains special provisions
for voting on matters connected with rule creation and adaptation, that
is, relating to interpretations, waivers, and amendments of the wTo and
related Agreements. A stringent three-quarters majority is required for
interpretations and waivers (as opposed to the previous two-thirds GATr
requirement). Depending upon the obligations involved, an amendment
requires either unanimous or two-thirds majority approval in order to
become effective.
62 /bid., art. VI(4).
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a) Interpretations
Under general customary international law principles, an
interpretation of an international legal instrument becomes binding
upon a sovereign state only when that state gives its assent, or when the
interpretation becomes a "generally accepted" principle among states, as
indicated by state conduct and opinio juris. GATT 1947 made no explicit
provision for such rule creation through definitive interpretation.
However, the authority for joint action under article XXV(1), with a
view to "facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this
Agreement,' '63 broadly gave the contracting parties the capability of
rendering legal and binding interpretations of GATT rules through
decisions.64
Under the WTO Agreement, exclusive authority to adopt binding
interpretations of the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade
Agreements is explicitly bestowed upon the Ministerial Conference and
the General Council. Interpretations are to be adopted by a three-
quarters majority of the members. For those Multilateral Trade
Agreements in Annex 1, the authority is to be exercised on the basis of a
recommendation by the particular Council overseeing the functioning of
that Agreement. The Agreement explicitly stipulates that the power to
adopt binding interpretations "shall not be used in a manner that would
undermine the amendment provisions in Article X."65 Thus, where an
interpretation would amount to an amendment affecting members'
procedural or substantive rights, the article X amendment provisions
must be respected and it will not be binding upon a member without that
state's acceptance.
The authority to adopt definitive interpretations of the wTo
Agreement and related Multilateral Trade Agreements represents a new
power institutionalized at the international level, and shows the
willingness of states to develop wTo rules and disciplines as necessary.
The three-quarters voting requirement will carry the rule-creation
process forward more easily than would a unanimity requirement.
However, the fact that any interpretation amounting to an amendment
63 G ATr 1947,supra note 28.
64 But see Restructuring GAIr, supra note 8 at 57-58, where Jackson expresses some doubt
about this power. However, he concedes the possibility "that the practice of GATr in its four
decades of existence has itself established an interpretation of the Article XXV powers to include
the power to interpret."
65 wro Agreement, supra note 2, art. IX(2).
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will not bind a state unless it gives its assent shows a reticence to transfer
sovereignty to the international level by reserving to the state the final
decision to adopt new obligations.
b) Waivers
The power to grant waivers which permit derogations from an
international legal instrument is also a power of rule creation, as it
affects the substantive rights and obligations of members.66 GATr 1947
generally provided for the granting of waivers in exceptional
circumstances and with approval of a two-thirds majority of votes cast.67
The wro Agreement contains far more stringent and precise provisions
on the granting of waivers, covering time limits, monitoring, and
termination of waivers.
The waiver of an obligation of a member under the WTO
Agreement or any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements is within the
authority of the Ministerial Conference. 68 Waiver decisions are
generally to be taken by three-quarters majority vote, with certain
exceptions provided for. Waiver requests under the wro Agreement are
to be submitted to the Ministerial Conference for decision by consensus.
The Ministerial Conference is to decide upon a time period, not to
exceed ninety days, for consideration of the request. If no consensus is
reached within this period, a decision to grant a waiver is to be taken by
three-quarters majority. Waiver requests concerning the Multilateral
Trade Agreements in Goods, the GATS, or the TRmIPS are first to be
submitted to their respective Councils for consideration during a period
not greater than ninety days. After consideration, the pertinent Council
is to submit a report to the Ministerial Conference.
A Ministerial Conference decision granting a waiver must be
accompanied by an account of the circumstances justifying the waiver, its
terms and conditions, and its termination date. Where a waiver is
granted for more than a year, it must be reviewed by the Ministerial
Conference within that year and annually thereafter until it terminates.
The Ministerial Conference, based on its annual review, can extend,
modify, or terminate the waiver.69 Decisions concerning the Plurilateral
6 6 See Steger, supra note 10 at 144.
6 7 Supra note 28, art. XXV(5).
6 8 
wro Agreement, supra note 2, art. IX(3).
69 Ibid., art. IX(4).
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Trade Agreements, including those on interpretations and waivers, are
to be governed by the relevant agreement. 70
These new waiver provisions reflect a preference for temporary,
justified, closely-monitored, and controlled waivers permitting
derogations from wTo legal norms that terminate as soon as compliance
is feasible. The fact that control and supervision of the waiver process is
centralized and unified in the Ministerial Council (which will also benefit
from the expertise of the relevant Councils) will significantly aid in
bringing uniformity and consistency to the process and will encourage
common approaches to waiver requests.
c) Amendments
Power to amend international agreements gives authority for the
creation and adaptation of rules. For this reason, sovereign states have
been loathe to accept an amendment power at the international level
where it would encroach upon their autonomy and their control over
their substantive international legal obligations. Previously, GATT 1947
Article XXX provided that unanimous consent was required to alter
Article I and II, XXIX, and XXX.71 Other amendments were effective,
but only in respect of those that accepted them, where two-thirds of the
contracting parties approved them. 72
The WTO Agreement provision concerning amendments 73 does
not altogether do away with the sovereign right of a state to reserve to
itself the right to choose whether it wishes to accede to new obligations
under the Agreement. Any WTO member can submit an amendment
proposal relating to the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade
Agreements to the Ministerial Council and the General Council. While
amendments to purely procedural provisions will bind -all members, an
amendment to the substantive rights and obligations of the members will
not be binding without a member's acceptance. 74 This reflects a
retention of some sovereign authority at the state level, and a refusal to
70 ibid., art. IX(5).
71 Supra note 28.
72 See World Trade, supra note 30 at 73.
73 wro Agreement, supra note 2, art. X.
74 See T.M. Stikas & K.E. Helne, "The World Trade Organization and Dispute Settlement
under the Uruguay Round Agreements," in G. Lew, ed., The Commerce Department Speaks on
International Trade and Investment, vol. 1 (New York: Practising Law Institute, 1994) at 4.
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allow the substantive legal design of the international rule system to be
changed without specific and express consent from each state.
This brief examination of the functions, scope, structure, and
powers of decision making and rule interpretation of the wTo
Agreement is revealing for several reasons. First, the international
community has acknowledged the utility of strengthening the legal and
institutional framework for the management of their trade relations.
This they have achieved through the creation of both a permanent
institutionalized forum for trade discussion, and a unified system for the
administration of a vast array of substantive international commercial
norms.
Second, the constant involvement of the Ministerial Conference
in the decision-making process will ensure more active involvement of
domestic political systems in the international process of rule
development, and will lead to a more prompt implementation of
decisions and policies concluded at the international level.
Third, however, while the new trade institution has broad powers
to administer and oversee the process of international trade, its curtailed
powers of decision making and rule creation reveal that sovereign states
have maintained the ultimate authority concerning the evolution of their
international trading obligations. The benefits of pooling sovereign
authority at the international level in the trade sphere in order for each
state to gain influence over the activities of other states have clearly been
recognized in the establishment of the wTO. However, states are as yet
unwilling to cede to the international plane their ultimate discretion and
autonomy in opting "in" or "out" of developing the architecture of the
legal system which will govern them, even if opting in to perpetuate their
influence will virtually always be in their interest in a world of
increasingly interdependent economies.
B. Trade Policy Review Mechanism
The Trade Policy Review Mechanism was adopted by the
Uruguay Round midterm review agreements in April 1989. 75 According
to this document, the purpose of the TPRM
is to contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and
commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the
Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral
75 Being annex 3 to the wro Agreement, in Results of the Uruguay Round, supra note 2 at 434
[hereinafter TPRM].
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trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade
policies and practices of Members. 76
With this objective in view, the TeRM permits the "regular
collective appreciation and evaluation of the full range of individual
Members' trade policies and practices and their impact on the
functioning of the multilateral trading system."'77 This peer review of
trade policies, however, is not "intended to serve as a basis for the
enforcement of specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute
settlement procedures, or to impose new policy commitments on
Members."78 Not primarily a rule-oriented instrument, the TPRM has,
however, a secondary normative objective: it aims to promote domestic
trade policy transparency, in recognition of its inherent importance to
the furtherance of rule development and compliance. This will help
members to anticipate and defuse potential trade-related conflicts.
The TRm is administered by the General Council meeting as the
TPRB. The TeRm Agreement sets out the procedure for the periodic
review of members' trade policies, with the determining factor for the
frequency of review of a member's policies being impact on the
functioning of the international trading system. The four members with
the largest impact (the EU is counted as one member) are subject to
review every two years. The next sixteen are to be reviewed every four
years. Other members will be reviewed every six years, with an option
for longer periods for least-developed members. Any member which
implements policies with a significant impact on its trading partners may
exceptionally be requested by the TPRM, after consultation, to accelerate
its next review.
Rather than a rigorous interrogation, the review sessions are
more like discussions or consultations with the member under review. 79
The review is founded on a report drawn up by the member(s) in
question and a report drawn up by the Secretariat, based on information
generally available and as provided to it by the member under review.
The results of the review are published and sent to the Ministerial
Conference, which is to take note of it.
The TPRM Agreement also contains a reporting requirement,
stipulating that each member should report to the TPRB on a regular
basis in order to achieve the greatest possible degree of transparency.
76 Iba at 434.
77 Ibid.
78 bid.
79 See Curzon Price, supra note 35 at 99-101.
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The TPRB is obligated to undertake an appraisal of the TPRM not more
than five years after the WTO Agreement's entry into force, and to
present the results of its appraisal to the Ministerial Conference. In
addition, the TPRB is also to undertake an "annual overview of
developments in the international trading environment which are having
an impact on the multilateral trading system."80
Observers have differred in their view of the nature and utility of
the TERM. While dispute settlement reforms are generally considered a
rule-oriented or legalistic development, Price, for example, argues that
the TRm in contrast "reflects a diplomatic and peer-pressure approach
to the enforcement problem."81 While some see considerable utility in
the T'Rm's pragmatic peer-pressure approach to increased transparency,
Jackson has criticized precisely this aspect of the TPRM as a step
backward for GATr's rule-oriented development. Jackson has noted that
[t]hese reviews could indeed be an important addition to the GATr, providing information
to many GATr members about the trade policies of particular Contracting Parties, and
offering an opportunity for criticism of those policies.82
But he has also written that
it must be recognized that these reviews are not likely to have a significant impact on the
implementation or effectiveness of the legal obligations contained in the variety of GATr
treaties and protocols, including those that will come into effect at the end of the
Uruguay Round. Indeed there are some risks that this review mechanism will divert
attention from the legal norms in such a way as actually to decrease the pressure on
Contracting Parties to observe those norms. To some degree, the [TPRM] is a concession
to the view that GAris primarily a "negotiating" or "consulting" organization, rather
than one which tries to define and implement reasonably precise norms to help the
standardization of world trading activities.83
Notwithstanding Jackson's criticism, the TPRM can also arguably
be considered as a secondary weapon in the rule-oriented arsenal.
Consisting of a pragmatic peer review with a focus on discussion and
negotiation, it has the added effect of casting light on domestic policies
and practices, and providing an opportunity for their appraisal in
relation to the contextual international norms. While ostensibly leaving
state sovereignty untouched, the principle of submitting to peer review
and criticism of policies does indeed smack of acknowledgement of an
advanced degree of economic interdependence, and the consequent
80 TpiM, supra note 75 at 437.
81 Curzon Price, supra note 35 at 100-01.
82 Restructuring GArr,supra note 8 at 79-80.
8 3 bid. at 80.
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importance of channelling state policy-making toward the development
of common, accepted approaches in the trade policy arena. Through
exposure of unacceptable domestic policies, the n'RM sets parameters
within which it encourages adherence to accepted international norms.
Obviously, the more autonomous and intrusive investigative authority
residing in the Secretariat, the more candid and credible its appraisal
and the more effective the review. Another important condition for the
effectiveness of the rPRM is that the norms furnishing the standard of
review must be fairly precise and concrete and represent a strong
consensus about what is desirable and acceptable.8 4
There is no binding legal avenue for enforcement of reforms to
any non-compliant policies which may be exposed during the review,
except perhaps through subsequent resort to the Dispute Settlement
Mechanism (DsM) by a member affected by the non-compliant measure.
However, a documentary archive would be created as a permanent
record of the trade-related conduct of each member under review. The
knowledge that a written record of the review will be published, and that
a further review will arrive as scheduled will presumably encourage
compliance or at least a move toward convergence with international
norms.
Increased transparency will also have the effect of raising
knowledge at the domestic level, so that citizens can make informed
judgments concerning optimal policies and costs and benefits of
alternative measures based upon this information. Thus, surveillance at
the international level must be complemented and reinforced by
domestic surveillance.85 While the process is pragmatic, it is based on
legalism: although national sovereignty is apparently maintained intact
in the TPRM, there is a tacit acknowledgement that transparency and
exposure of non-compliance is an initial step towards facilitating policy
harmonization and convergence with international rules. The TPRM may
not represent a pooling of state sovereignty in the sense of permitting
each member to increase its authority by designing and participating in a
binding supranational rule structure; it does, however, represent a pool
for "mirroring" state sovereignty in relation to an international rule
consensus. The implicit focus is on rendering national legislation and
policies more compatible with international norms, thus highlighting the
importance of the international legal framework.
84 R. Blackhurst, "Strengthening GATT Surveillance of Trade-Related Policies" in E.-U.
Petersmann & M. Hilf, eds., The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 2d ed.
(Deventer Kluwer, 1991) 123 at 143.
85 bid. at 126.
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The TPRM will assume some of the work of, and decrease
pressure on, the DSM. Prior to the Uruguay Round, resort to the DSM by
lodging a complaint was virtually the only vehicle for exposure of non-
compliance.8 6 GATT-inconsistent actions by contracting parties would
regularly persist unchallenged. There was reluctance to refer a
complaint for dispute settlement, both because of the dubious efficiency
and considerable time requirements characteristic of the former panel
process, and also because potential complainants were hesitant to open
their own GATr-inconsistent policies to scrutiny.87 As a process for the
regular exposure of non-compliance through individual investigations of
trade-related policies has now been institutionalized in the TPRM, there
will be less pressure on the dispute settlement system for the
performance of this function.88
It is interesting to note the differences between the WTO TPRM
and NAFTA'S arrangements concerning the promotion of trade policy
transparency. With transparency as one of its chief objectives,8 9 NAFrA
requires that each party must ensure that its laws, regulations,
procedures, and administrative practices relating to the Agreement are
promptly published or otherwise made available.90 NAFTA parties are
also to notify other parties of "any proposed or actual measure that the
Party considers might materially affect the operation of [the Agreement]
or otherwise substantially affect" other parties' interests under the
Agreement.91 Under NAFTA, control of transparency remains strictly
within state authority. Notification of material measures must take place
only to the maximum extent possible. While NAFTA parties are obligated
to provide interested persons and parties with an opportunity to
comment on relevant proposed measures,9 2 there is no provision for
constant surveillance or regular review of trade policies. Due to NAFrA'S
decentralized legal order, it cannot provide the TPRM'S institutionalized
multilateral procedure with an investigative mandate vested in the
Secretariat and a rotating schedule for individual trade policy review.
86 Curzon Price, supra note 35 at 96.
871bid
88 MJ. Trebilcock & R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (London: Routledge,
1995) at 398.
8 9 See NAFrA, supra note 26, art. 102.1.
90/bi, art. 1802.1.
91 Ibid., art. 1803.
9 2 bid, art. 1802.2.
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C. Dispute Settlement Mechanism
The substantive rules in any legal regime are only as effective as
the capacity of that regime to provide remedies for breaches of those
rules or the rights they secure.93 Without the judge in the background,
contracts and other binding legal arrangements are of little value. 94 The
international legal system labours under the disadvantage of lacking an
effective judge or "world court" with a comprehensive mandate to
provide relief for the violation of international obligations.9s
A strong, credible, and effective dispute settlement system, which
maintains the balance of rights and duties of members within the system
and operates to provide legal remedies for violations of agreed-upon
international norms, is therefore a keystone of a rule-oriented
multilateral trade regime under the wro Agreement. The history of the
GATT dispute settlement process reveals a strong tension between, and
an effort to balance, the pragmatic handling of trade tensions through
negotiation and compromise, and the legalistic settlement of disputes
through the application of previously agreed-upon binding international
rules and procedures. 96
The GATT 1947 dispute settlement regime, set out in articles
XXII and XXIII of that Agreement, emphasized compromise,
consultation, and pragmatism.9 7 Practices evolved on the basis of these
provisions and were codified in the 1979 Tokyo Round Dispute
Settlement Understanding (Dsu 1979).98 Although the DSU 1979 did not
signify a radical transformation of the dispute settlement procedures, "it
was significant in that it represented a willingness of the Contracting
Parties to reaffirm their commitment to the existing dispute settlement
93 See Lowenfeld, supra note 35 at 488.
94 See J. Tumlir, "GATT Rules and Community Law" in M. Hilf, F. Jacobs & E.-U.
Petersmann, eds., The European Community and the GATrT (Deventer: Kluwer, 1986) at 6 and 20,
cited in Restructuring GAcr, supra note 8 at 55.
95 While the original 1948 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization provided
for recourse to the International Court of Justice on questions of law arising under the Charter,
neither the GAIr 1947 nor the Wro Agreement makes any provision for this. The Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, being annex 2 to the Wro Agreement,
in Results of the Uruguay Round, supra note 2 at 404 [hereinafter DSU], also stipulates that its dispute
settlement procedures are exclusive.
96 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 88 at 38; and Lowenfeld, supra note 35 at 479.
97 Supra note 28.
98 "Understanding Regarding the Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance," GATr Doc. 114907 (28 November 1979), 26th Supp. B.I.S.D. (1980) 210.
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process and to make explicit what had previously been only informal
practice."99 However, the legal status and authority of this DSU 1979
remained ambiguous, in part because each of the nine Tokyo Round N'm
Codes also provided for its own dispute settlement mechanism.
Steger has noted that although the GATT 1947's rules were
originally vague, "a tapestry of interpretations or jurisprudence defining
what those rules mean" has been woven through the dispute settlement
process.1ZO In this way, judicial decisions developed the GATT 1947 as a
constitution far beyond the original drafters' intent. However, although
some rule-oriented evolution occurred in the interim, in 1992 Hudec
could still remark:
Governments have not yet been willing to surrender any meaningful degree of autonomy
to international legal regimes in economic affairs. GATr's dispute settlement machinery
has been celebrated as a major victory along the road to enforceable norms-and rightly
so. But on the tree of legal evolution GATr's adjudication machinery is still down at the
level studied by legal anthropologists, right alongside dispute resolution ceremonies
practiced among primitive societies.1 01
The 1994 dispute settlement arrangements, essentially based
upon measures adopted after the 1988 Montreal midterm review, are
reformed and streamlined. They augur a less crude and far more rule-
oriented dispute settlement process, with enhanced rule-compliance and
rule-enforcement capacity. The DSU will also be supplemented by the
wro acting as a permanent organization and forum for the multilateral
discussion on trade disputes. The WTO itself will operate informally to
encourage and ensure rule compliance. This will promote dispute
avoidance. While the dispute settlement reforms are significant in
enhancing the rule-oriented nature of the organization, the wro's
permanent forum for discussion, as well as the institutionalized
mechanism for trade policy surveillance in the TPRM, will aid in defusing
tension and encouraging pre-emptive resolution of trade disputes.
The DSU 1994 states that
[t]he dispute settlement system of the wro is a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSH
99 United States International Trade Commission, Review of the Effectiveness of Trade Dispute
Settlement under the GAIT and the Tokyo Round Agreements, Report to the Committee on Finance,
United States Senate, USITC Publication 1793, December 1985 at 27.
100 Steger, supra note 10 at 141.
101 Supra note 9 at 6.
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cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements.1 0 2
The DSU emphasizes that the prompt settlement of disputes "is essential
to the effective functioning of the wTo and the maintenance of a proper
balance between the rights and obligations of Members."
103
The aim of the WTo dispute resolution mechanism is to reach a
positive, and preferably mutually acceptable, solution to a dispute. In
the absence of a mutually acceptable solution, the primary objective is
withdrawal of inconsistent measures. Compensation will be provided
only where the removal of the offending measure is not immediately
possible. The last resort envisaged by the DSU is the suspension of
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements, which
can be applied against the offending member subject to DSB
authorization and surveillance.
The DSU has created an integrated system, to be administered by
the DSB, which has responsibility for all the steps under virtually all
disputes arising under the wTo Agreement or any of the Multilateral
Trade Agreements (the "covered agreements"). The DSB is also
responsible for disputes arising under the Plurilateral Trade
Agreements, 104 but only to the extent that the parties to a particular
Plurilateral Trade Agreement agree that the DSU will apply. Where the
dispute involves a Plurilateral Agreement, "only those Members that are
parties to that Agreement may participate in decisions or actions taken
by the DSB with respect to that dispute."
105
Membership of the DSB is the same as that of the General
Council, but the DSB will have its own Chairperson, staff, and rules of
procedure. The DSB will exercise the authority of the General Council
and the Councils and committees of the covered agreements, meeting
"as often as necessary" to carry out its functions within the relevant time
frames. 106 The DSB is to administer all dispute settlement rules and
procedures, including the establishment of panels, consideration and
adoption of panel and appellate reports, surveillance of implementation
of rulings, and recommendations and authorization of suspension of
concessions or other obligations as retaliatory measures. DSB decisions
are to be made on a consensual basis.
102 isu, supra note 95, art. 3(2).
103 Ii, art. 3(3).
104 Supra note 52 at 438.
105 DSU, supra note 95, art. 2(1).
lo6 Ibid, art. 2(1).
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Figure 2: Dispute Settlement Understanding Procedures
Consultations
(Members may request panel ifno solution fouid within 60 days)
Good offices, concilliation or
mediation by Director-General
DSB establishes panel
(No later than 2nd DSB meeting)
Terms of reference
(Stan dard terms unless special terms agreed witlh 20 days)
Composition
(To be agreed within 20 days or decided by Director-General)
Panel examination
(In general not to exceed 6 months, 3 months in cases of urgency)
Meetings Meetings
with parties with 3rd parties
E xpert[
Review
Group
Panel submits reports to parties
Interim Review
Panel circulates report to DSB
DSB adopts panel report
(Within 60 days unless appealed)
Appellate Review
(Not to exceed 90 days)
DSB adopts Appellate Report
(7lithin 30 day)
.1
DSB monitors implementation of adopted
panel/Appellate Body recommendations
I
Parties negotiate compensation
pending full implementation
DSB authorizes retaliation pending
full implementation
(60 days after expiry of
"reasonable period of time")
Source: GAT" Focus No. 107, May 1994.
This broad authority residing in the DSB will mean greater
automaticity in the establishment of panels (in the absence of a
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consensus against establishment), terms of reference and composition of
panels, and in adoption of panel and appellate reports. The DSU
furnishes strict time limits and more precise rules for each phase in the
process. A major advantage of the new DSU will be that the same panel
will be able to address all issues raised under any of the covered
agreements.10 7
The DSU stresses the importance of consultations in achieving the
resolution of disputes. Each member has undertaken to "accord
sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for
consultation regarding any representations made by another Member
concerning measures affecting the operation of any covered agreement
taken within the territory of the former."108
A member must respond to a request for consultations within ten
days, and enter into consultations within thirty days of the request. If
after sixty days of the request there is no settlement, the complaining
party may request the establishment of a panel. If any of these deadlines
are missed or consultations are denied, the complaining party may then
proceed directly to request that a panel be established. The member
requesting consultations must notify the DSB and the relevant Councils
and Committees of the request. Third parties with a "substantial trade
interest" in consultations may participate in them if the requested
member agrees that their claim is well-founded. 109
Good offices, conciliation, and mediation may be undertaken
voluntarily if the parties to the dispute agree. 110 Binding arbitration is
also available as an alternative avenue of dispute resolution where issues
are "clearly defined" between the parties.1
11
Where consultations fail to resolve the dispute, the DSB will
establish a panel, unless the DSB decides by consensus against its
establishment. The DsU sets out specific rules and deadlines for deciding
the terms of reference and composition of panels.112 The ad hoc panels
are to be composed of three well-qualified individuals drawn from a
roster maintained by the Secretariat. Once established, the panel must
complete its work within six months. Three months are added where a
107 Stikas & Heine, supra note 74 at 6.
108 DSU, supra note 95, art. 4(2).
109 bid., art. 4(11).
110 IbiL, art. 5(1).
111/Ibi, art. 25(1).
112 bit, arts. 7 and 8, respectively.
1995]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
panel report is appealed. An additional three months may also be
permitted in exceptionally complex cases.113
The function of the panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its
responsibilities under the DSU and covered agreements. Thus,
a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with
the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in
making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered
agreements. 1 4
The DSU outlines panel procedures in detail. Third parties having a
"substantial interest" in the matter under investigation can be heard
before, and make written submissions to, the panelM1 s The Secretariat
will continue to assist panels "especially on the legal, historical and
procedural aspects of the matters dealt with. '116
Strict deadlines are imposed for the adoption of panel and
appellate reports, lessening the possibility for a losing party to draw out
or block the adoption process. Within sixty days of the issuance of a
panel report where no appeal is lodged, and within thirty days of the
issuance of an appellate report, the DSB is to adopt the report
unconditionally unless there is a consensus against adoption.
If an adopted report holds that a challenged measure is
inconsistent with a provision in a covered agreement, the DSU is
supposed to recommend that the offending state bring the measure into
conformity with the pertinent agreement. A report can suggest ways in
which the member can implement the recommendations.
Recognizing that "[p]rompt compliance with recommendations
or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of
disputes to the benefit of all Members, 11 7 the DSU provides for the
surveillance of implementation of recommendations and rulings. At a
DSB meeting within thirty days of the adoption of a panel or Appellate
Body report, the member concerned must inform the DSB of its
11 3 bMa, art. 20.
114 Ibid., art. 11.
1 15 1bid, art. 10(2).
1 1 6 Ibid., art. 27. Lowenfeld, supra note 35 at 485, points out that the Secretariat has played a
significant, but little-known role in the GATT dispute settlement panel process, as GATT staff
members from both economic and legal offices have sat with panelists, prepared drafts of findings of
fact, and in some instances drafted key sections of panel reports. He notes that, "[in many ways,
this little-known role of the secretariat has been highly useful-providing an institutional memory
and a safeguard in case one or more panelists were unprepared."
1 17 DSU, supra note 95, art. 21(1).
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intentions concerning the implementation of recommendations and
rulings. If immediate compliance is not possible, the member will have a
reasonable period of time in which to comply.
In contrast with past practice, the determination of what
constitutes a "reasonable period" is subject to DSB approval or
agreement between the parties within forty-five days of the report's
adoption. If this proves impossible, the "reasonable period" will be
determined by binding arbitration to take place within ninety days of the
issuance of the report. The arbitrator will be chosen by the parties or,
failing agreement, by the Director-General. A guideline of fifteen
months is offered as a "reasonable period.
118
If parties disagree over whether a measure taken to comply with
a panel report is consistent with the agreement in question, the issue is
referred to a dispute settlement panel-if possible, the panel that heard
the original dispute.
The DSB is charged with keeping the implementation of the
report under surveillance, an issue which any DSB member can raise at
any time following the report's adoption. Unless the DSB decides
otherwise, the subject is to be placed on the DSB agenda six months after
the establishment of the "reasonable period" of time, and is to remain
on the agenda thereafter until the issue is resolvedP1 9 Extensive and
precise provisions govern the last-ditch option of compensation and the
temporary suspension of concessions, in the event the losing party fails
to remove the offending measure in compliance with a report.
Retaliation after expiry of the "reasonable period" cannot be blocked by
a losing party; there must be a consensus against it in the DSB.
The concept of appellate review of panel decisions by a
permanent appellate body is perhaps the most significant and innovative
attribute of the DSU. While it has been criticized as potentially reducing
the authority and prestige of panels,120 because of the concern that the
losing party will automatically appeal an unfavourable panel report, the
addition of an appellate instrument was inevitable once the adoption of
panel reports became virtually automatically effective.121 Appeals are
"limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal
118 Iid., art. 21(3).
1 1 9 Ibid., art. 21(6).
120 p. Pescatore, "The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Its Present Situation and Its
Prospects," (1993) 10 J. Int'l Arb. 27, cited in Lowenfeld, supra note 35 at 483.
121 TIbi
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interpretations developed by the panel."122 Appellate panels are to be
composed of three individuals, unaffiliated with any government, drawn
from a standing pool of seven persons of "recognized authority, with
demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject
matter of the covered agreements generally,"123 to be appointed by the
DSB and available at all times on short notice.
The Appellate Body is to submit its report to the DSB within sixty
days of the filing of the appeal. As mentioned, the appellate report
"shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties
to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the
Appellate Body report within thirty days following its circulation to the
Members." 124
As in international law generally, there is technically no stare
decisis in the GATr/wTo dispute resolution process.125 However, even
during the Uruguay Round, GATT panel reports were increasingly being
viewed as a body of case law,126 with panels referring to previous reports
as having a persuasive force resembling binding precedent.1 27 Adopted
reports provide guidance to the application of GATr/WTO principles; even
unadopted reports have furnished an indication of general practice. The
newly-entrenched virtually automatic adoption of panel reports (in the
absence of an appeal or a consensus against adoption) will produce more
strengthened and authoritative applications of wro principles through
panel and appellate interpretations. The Appellate Body will play a
significant role in bringing consistency and uniformity to the
interpretation of the international norms enshrined in the wro's
constitutional base, and will create an authoritative body ofjurisprudence on questions of law concerning the covered agreements.
The extensive reforms encapsulated in the DSu have prompted
many observers to argue that the adjudicatory and legalistic paradigm
has clearly prevailed. Lowenfeld, for example, has stated that the DSU
"seems to establish within the GATr for the first time a genuine system of
enforceable rules and remedies." 128
1 2 2 Ibid., art. 17(6).
123 Ibid., art. 17(3).
12 4 bid, art. 17(14).
1 2 5 See Restructuring GA7T,supra note 8 at 67.
126 Steger, supra note 10 at 141.
1 2 7 Restructuring GArT,supra note 8 at 67.
128 Supra note 35 at 481.
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The greater automaticity in the establishment of panels and the
adoption of panel and appellate reports, the strict time limits for each
step, and the strengthened surveillance procedures to reinforce
implementation of panel rulings all reflect a willingness by the members
to design and abide by more rigorous international rules. To this extent,
they have transferred some of their sovereign authority in the trade area
to the international arena by agreeing to abide by this new discipline. By
the same token, each state has gained influence over the actions of other
members in the system because of their identical undertakings.
Despite the new developments, however, the wro dispute
settlement procedures still lack many characteristics necessary to
transform them into the truly effective international court for
international trade, which the present extent of global transnational
economic activity calls for. The wro system of legal remedies and rule
enforcement has a very long road to travel before it remotely resembles
the Eu's intricate system for the management of economic
interdependence through effective dispute settlement and rule
enforcement.
No privatization of international trade disputes has occurred.
Even arbitration remains strictly state-to-state. 129 NAFrA, for example, in
addition to its comprehensive government-to-government dispute
settlement procedures,130 also provides for mixed investor-state
arbitration.131 This is limited to disputes arising under Chapter 11 of the
Agreement dealing with investment matters. Any NAFrA private investor
alleging breach of investment-related obligations by a NAFTA host
country other than the investor's own may establish an arbitral panel to
hear the dispute.132 The arbitration may be governed by any one of
three sets of arbitration rules:133 (i) the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention (provided that
both the disputing party and the party of the investor are signatories);
(ii) the Additional Facility Rules of icsiD (provided that either the
disputing party or the party of the investor, but not both, is a party to the
ICSID Convention); or (iii) the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (uNcrrIRAL) Arbitration Rules. By failing to
129 DSU, supra note 95, art. 25.
130 Supra note 26, c. 20.
131 See Fried, supra note 27 at 48-49.
132 NAFrA, supra note 26, art. 1116 deals with claims by an investor on its own behalf; art. 1117
deals with claims by an investor on behalf of an enterprise.
133 See ibid., art. 1120.
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offer an option of privatized or mixed arbitration similar to the NAFMA
Chapter 11 model, even within certain limited areas, the wrro dispute
settlement arrangements fall short of providing any direct avenue for
individuals to pursue claims arising under any of the WTO Agreements.
w'ro dispute settlement therefore remains at the public inter-state level,
with governments as the only possible complainants and defendants.
In addition, none of the rules contained in the WTO Agreement
are yet directly applicable or enforceable by individuals before domestic
courts as an integral part of their state's domestic law.134 Members have
not undertaken to respect the authority of wTo panels over matters and
persons within their territory falling within the jurisdiction of the wro
under the any of the wro Agreements.
The wTo panel process does not possess the absolute, valid, and
binding legal authority enjoyed by, for example, the EcJ within the Eu.
Ultimately, wTo members retain the right to exercise their state
sovereignty by deciding not to implement the panel recommendations in
their domestic trade order. However, there is a price attached to this
decision to invoke sovereignty to justify non-compliance:135 the risk of
retaliation. Under the WTO Agreement, a state also has the right to
exercise its sovereignty by choosing to withdraw completely from the
wTo.
136
The United States, for example, has devised its own method to
deal with this question. A compromise that surfaced during the
congressional wTo ratification debate during the autumn of 1994 led to
the establishment of a panel of retired American judges to review all
wro panel reports that decide against the United States. If the judges
find that a decision is unfair, any member of Congress can introduce a
resolution calling on the White House to renegotiate dispute settlement
rules. If the judges find three unfair decisions in five years, Congress can
vote to withdraw from the wTo.
As economic interdependence becomes ever more profound,
however, the price exacted for a state invoking its sovereignty in this way
may become so high-due to the necessity of remaining in the
increasingly close-knit world trading "club"-that it no longer remains a
viable option. Foregone would be the benefits and prosperity associated
with participation in the WTo's trade liberalization and integration
134 See E.-U. Petersmann, "Strengthening the Domestic Legal Framework of the oATr
Multilateral Trade System" in Petersmann & Hilf, eds., supra, note 84 at 33.
135 See G. Horlick, "Sovereignty and International Trade Regulation" (1994) 20 Can.-U.S.
L.J 57 at 60.
136 Supra note 2, art. XV.
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processes, and an international framework of rules designed to protect
state interests and promote stability and consistency. The isolated state
would then be at the mercy of the world's transnational economic forces
without the strengthened discipline and influence which the DSU,
combined with the other legal and institutional attributes of the wro,
have introduced for states in the realm of international trade.
VII. CONCLUSION
Progressive economic integration demands a stronger rule-based
legal framework, which recognizes the contingent interest of states in
pooling their sovereignty at the international level in the trade sphere.
While there is still far to go before a truly effective rule of international
trade law is entrenched, the legal-institutional advancements heralded
by the formation of the wTo represent progress in this direction.
The former GATr/WTo Director-General Peter Sutherland has
stated:
The wTO is it no way an assault on any country's sovereignty. If anything it enhances it
by providing a more effective dispute settlement mechanism through which countries can
ensure that their rights are respected and by providing a permanent forum for adapting
the international trade policy agenda to the real needs of nations. Effective exercise of
sovereignty is indissoluble from the rule of law in international relations and this is what
the 'vro enforces.13 7
Taken together, the permanently institutionalized trade policy
forum and unified common institutional framework of the wro; the
increased transparency and rule adherence promoted by the TPRM; and
the more legalistic nature of the dispute settlement system for rule
compliance and rule enforcement to provide enhanced protection of
states' rights and legal remedies, equip states with a common platform
from which to design and participate in an international legal system
which effectively represents and respects their interests. This is the
future of state sovereignty in the international trade order.
The Eu has accommodated the changing nature of sovereignty
and its reallocation from the state to the Union level by addressing the
democratic deficit (through direct election of, and more influence
attributed to, the European Parliament), and by entrenching the
principle of subsidiarity into its constitutional order. As global economic
integration deepens and commercial issues are increasingly annexed to
the international agenda, the world trading community and the wro will
137 Cited in GATr Focus No. 110, August-September 1994 at 7.
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have to confront similar issues. Questions of where sovereignty actually
resides and where it should be allocated for the most efficient and
effective regulation of transnational economic activity (i.e., at the sub-
state, regional, state, or supranational level) will become ever more
salient.
